In the aftermath of a significant natural disaster such as an earthquake, communication systems often face immediate challenges. This phenomenon has been observed in previous earthquakes in Turkey, including the ones that occurred on February 20, 2023, and April 23, 2025. Within minutes, mobile networks become overwhelmed as thousands, even millions, attempt to connect with their loved ones or seek assistance. This critical juncture underscores the paramount importance of communication in such situations. However, it also highlights the inherent limitations of GSM network designs.
Therefore, the pertinent question arises: can we construct GSM cellular systems capable of handling such sudden and overwhelming demand? If this is feasible, is it economically viable?
Technically, yes — but with some complexity.
A GSM network can be designed to respond to extreme spikes in demand. This can be done by adding more cell towers, reserving extra radio frequencies, installing backup power systems, and integrating technologies like mobile base stations on trucks, drones, or balloons. These systems can be deployed rapidly and scaled based on the needs of the disaster zone. On top of that, prioritizing traffic — for example, giving emergency responders access to the network first — can ensure that critical services remain operational.
There are also technical solutions that include dynamic load balancing and intelligent traffic management, allowing the network to redirect users to less crowded cells. The industry has also started experimenting with satellite-based mobile coverage and using AI to predict where capacity will be needed most. In short, from an engineering perspective, building a GSM system that can survive and respond to disaster demand is entirely possible.
Let the challenge begins.
The primary reason why GSM networks fail under pressure is not a lack of technical solutions, but rather the high cost associated with implementing those solutions. GSM base station capacity is determined by the number of carrier frequencies and time slots, with each carrier typically offering 8 time slots, of which 6–7 are used for voice communication. The effective user capacity is calculated using traffic engineering models like the Erlang B formula, which considers the number of available channels, the average call duration, and desired call blocking probability. For instance, a cell with 30 traffic channels and a 2% blocking rate may support around 22 Erlangs of traffic, translating to roughly 400–500 concurrent users under normal load. During disasters, this capacity is quickly exceeded due to simultaneous call attempts, infrastructure damage, and signaling overhead, leading to network saturation and communication breakdowns.
Networks are typically designed to accommodate average or anticipated peak demand, not the overwhelming surge that occurs during crises. To permanently construct infrastructure capable of handling such rare moments would entail substantial investments in underutilized infrastructure, including spectrum licenses, maintenance of underutilized towers, and the powering of backup systems. These costs are substantial and may not be justified unless there is a consistent and substantial use for the additional capacity.
In economic terms, overbuilding is challenging to justify unless there is a clear and consistent use for the extra capacity. Telecommunications companies operate in highly competitive markets where the return on investment is paramount. Therefore, unless regulatory authorities or governments intervene to provide subsidies for the enhanced resilience, it is unlikely that operators will bear the full cost of such investments on their own.
A hybrid model.
Rather than building massive capacity everywhere, the more sustainable approach is to use flexible and deployable infrastructure. Mobile base stations, shared emergency networks between operators, satellite backup, and temporary spectrum allocations are all examples of this hybrid model.

Furthermore, it is imperative that there be enhanced collaboration among telecommunication companies, government agencies, and emergency services. Disaster resilience in communications is not merely a technical issue; it also presents a governance challenge.
Indeed, we can construct resilient networks that endure disasters. However, rather than meticulously over-engineering every aspect initially, we should prioritize scalable, adaptable, and cost-effective models that can be promptly deployed when necessary. Disaster-proofing our communication systems is no longer a luxury; it has become a necessity.
The pertinent question remains: are we prepared to invest in preparedness prior to the next impending emergency?